| July 2006
Foreign Policy | Arms Control | Defense Policy | Diplomacy | Terrorism
Countries/Regions: Afghanistan | Africa | Balkans| China | Iran | Iraq | Israel | Middle East | North Korea | Russia |
A1- Universal Values, Specific Policies
Kissinger, Henry
National Interest, Summer 2006, #84, pp13-15
“This article presents an interview with Henry Kissinger, former U.S. Department of the State secretary, about current challenges facing the U.S. foreign policy. On the question on how the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks changed the international system, Kissenger said that it is that entirely new elements have entered into international affairs, but the first question one has to answer is whether there are general principles of foreign policy capable of being applied all over the world, simultaneously and in the same manner. About China, Kissinger warns that the U.S. should not view China as wanting to change the international system and instead view China as wanting to take a larges role within the international system.” Fulltext
A2 - The Bush Foreign Policy, Take Two
Blackwill, Robert, Rich Lowry and Dov Zakheim
National Interest, Summer 2006, #84, pp.20-29
Two distinguished practitioners -- and former members of the Bush Administration--join with one of America's leading conservative intellectuals offer their thoughts on the direction U.S. foreign policy will take in the last two years of the Bush Administration. They look at the 2006 National Security Strategy for guidance and as a framework for the formation of policy to address the challenges the United States will face in the upcoming months. Robert D. Blackwill, former deputy national security advisor of the Bush administration presidential envoy to Iraq and U.S. ambassador to India; now president of Barbour Griffith & Rogers International, a Washington lobbying and consulting firm. Rich Lowry, editor of the National Review. Dov S. Zakheim, former Department of Defense's chief financial officer, presently with the Nixon Center. Fulltext
A3 - Friction in U.S. Foreign Policy: Cultural Difficulties with the World
Lieutenant Colonel Andrew W. Stewart
Carlisle Papers, United States Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute (SSI), July 7, 2006, 29p
"The United States is so culturally different by virtue of its ‘ New World paradigm that its direct leadership style is becoming counterproductive. If the United States were more "street smart" on the world scene, it could better identify nuanced subtleties and better leverage allies, who, in turn, are better positioned to further American ideals abroad. However, such an indirect approach to world affairs is counterintuitive to most Americans, who are better known for their directness and cultural ineptitude. The U.S. approach to “culture” traditionally has been to blur the differences and seek commonality, which has been at the core of American domestic success in assimilating immigrants. The American challenge is to differentiate better between domestic and foreign policy formulas for success, which need to be different if America wishes to succeed in both areas. Americans must learn to work in more indirect ways with like-minded allies to create a world favorable to U.S. interests. This paper examines the ideological threats confronting the United States and America’s lack of cultural savvy, along with its implications, proposing a new outlook for policy leaders and strategists." Andrew W. Stewart is a member of the U.S. Army War College (USAWC), Class of 2006, and will assume the duties as the U.S. Army Japan (USARJ) G2, during the summer of 2006. Fulltext
A4 - Reappraising Nuclear Security Strategy
Lee, Rensselaer
Cato Institute Policy Analysis #571, June 14, 2006, 16p.
There are various combinations of methods to narrow the proliferation window in Russia and the other states that were once part of the Soviet Union. This paper recommends a strengthened proactive and intelligence-based nuclear security policy -- one that complements existing programs but enables authorities to better target potential adversaries seeking to obtain nuclear materials. The author recommends the following measures to close the proliferation gaps: “the construction of a "vulnerability profile" of each Russian facility that stores, produces, or works with weapons-usable nuclear materials; broadening the definition of nuclear security beyond the concept of containment, concentrating "more attention and resources on the demand side of the proliferation equation; and strengthening collaboration with Russian and other former Soviet security organizations.” Rensselaer Lee is a senior fellow at the Foreign Policy Research Institute in Philadelphia and president of Global Advisory Services in McLean, VA. Fulltext
A5 - Nonproliferation Diplomacy: An Interview with Ambassador Gregory L. Schulte
Pomper, Miles A.
Arms Control Today, July/August 2006, v36, #6, online edition
"Gregory L. Schulte is on the front lines of nonproliferation efforts as the U.S. permanent representative to the International Atomic Energy Agency in Vienna. In this interview, he discusses U.S. views on efforts to limit Iran’s nuclear program and to create nuclear fuel-supply assurances for non-nuclear-weapon states, as well as the recent U.S.-Indian civilian nuclear deal, among other subjects.” Miles A. Pomper is editor of “Arms Control Today”. Fulltext
A6 - Global Nuclear Stockpiles, 1945-2006
Norris, Robert S.; Kristensen, Hans M.
Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, July/August 2006, v62, #4, pp64-66
“Through a series of arms control agreements and unilateral decisions, nuclear weapon states have reduced the global stockpile to its lowest level in 45 years. Today, nine nations possess about 27,000 intact nuclear warheads--down from the 1986 Cold War high of 70,000-plus warheads. Yet, all five original nuclear weapon states continue to insist that nuclear weapons are essential to their national security, which translates into a substantial global stockpile for the foreseeable future and the possibility that more nations will want the Bomb,” according to this article. Robert S. Norris is affiliated with the Natural Resources Defense Council and Hans M. Kristensen is affiliated with the Federation of American Scientists. Fulltext
A7 - Beware of Boldness
Crane, Conrad C.
Parameters, Summer 2006, v36 #2, pp88-97
" This article looks at the ongoing defense transformation that is calling for U.S. Armed Forces leaders to be more bold and innovative in their conduct in the global war against terrorism. Examining closely the conduct of American military leaders, the author notes that leaders have been seldom seen as bold since the First World War. He contends that the country should look on leaders who are prudent and know how to make use of each opportunities that those who boldly take big risk..” Dr. Conrad C. Crane is the Director of the US Army MilitaryHistory Institute at Carlisle Barracks. Fulltext
A8 - The Future of the National Guard and Reserves
Wormuth, Christine E.
CSIS report, July 12, 2006, 150p, online edition
"The way the United States uses its National Guard and Reserves has been evolving over the last decade, but for many of those years the changes went unnoticed, even by members of the defense community. With the September 11 attacks and subsequent operations in Afghanistan and Iraq, however, the curtain has been raised on this process of transformation. Americans now see that the National Guard and Reserves are not just waiting in the wings in case the country goes to war, but rather are already an integral part of the military’s operational force deployed around the world. Is this remarkable change a short-term reaction to current events, or is it an appropriate shift for the longer term in light of future security challenges?” Christine Wormuth is a senior fellow in the CSIS International Security Program.
Fulltext
A9 - Slogan or Strategy?
Ullman, Harlan
National Interest, Summer 2006, #84, pp43-49
This article contends that the theoretical and intellectual construct of the concept "shock and awe" should be tested and evaluated through war games, seminars and then operational tests. There is widespread misuse of the term and despite the hype, and contrary to media reports, shock and awe were never inherent in the planning of Operation Iraqi Freedom. Finally, this article takes an abbreviated look at the future to determine where and whether shock and awe have any applications beyond conventional war. Harlan Ullman is a senior advisor at the Center for Strategic and International
Studies and a columnist for the Washington Times. Fulltext
A10 - All Talk and No Strategy: The Limits of Diplomacy
Rubin, Michael
Weekly Standard, July 24, 2006, online edition
“As Israeli warplanes pounded Lebanon last week, European leaders called for diplomacy. UN Secretary General Kofi Annan dispatched a three-member team to the region to urge all parties to exercise restraint. Even President George W. Bush said, "To help calm the situation, we've got diplomats in the region." Officials ritually promote diplomacy and dialogue, but absent an overarching strategy, these are no panacea. Indeed, diplomacy for diplomacy's sake can sometimes make matters worse. Rubin elaborates.”Michael Rubin is a resident scholar at the American Enterprise Institute and the editor of the " Middle East Quarterly”. Fulltext
A11 -
The Truman Standard
Goldgeier, James M. and Derek H. Chollet
American Interest, Summer 2006, v1, #4, pp.107-111
Since the end of the Cold War, it has become customary for American secretaries of state to compare the challenges before them to those confronted by Truman and his two distinguished top diplomats, Dean Acheson and his predecessor, General George C. Marshall… But in some important ways the analogy, if thought through, highlights more of the Administration’s shortcomings than its strengths.” The authors examine the “Truman Standard”— and how the Bush Administration measures up to it. James M. Goldgeier, former State Department official, and staff member of the National Security Council; now professor of political science and international politics at George Washington University. Derek H. Chollet, fellow in the
CSIS International Security Program. Order Article
A12 - Jihad 2.0
Labi, Nadya
The Atlantic Monthly, July/August 2006, v297, #6, pp 102-108
Websites with instructions on how to make bombs, on how to commit cyber-crimes and not be detected by law enforcement as well as videos clips of attacks against U.S. soldiers in Iraq – at least since the video of terrorist Al-Zarqawi beheading the American Nicholas Berg it is clear that jihadists use the internet intensely in order to disseminate terrorist information and to instigate new attacks. This article features one of the prominent internet-jihadists, Irhabi 007, his evolvement into a computer-savvy terrorist supporter as well as the efforts to use the internet in order to uncover and circumvent planned attacks by Islamic extremists. Nadya Labi is a writer based in New York. She has previously worked as Senior Editor at Legal Affairs and as Staff Writer at Time. Fulltext
A13 - The Terrorism Index
The Center for American Progress and the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Foreign Policy, July/ August 2006, #155, pp49-55
“Foreign Policy and the Center for American Progress teamed up to survey more than 100 of America’s top foreign-policy experts—Republicans and Democrats alike. The Foreign Policy/Center for American progress Terrorism Index is the first comprehensive effort to mine the highest echelons of America’s foreign-policy establishment for their assessment of how the United States is fighting the Global War on Terror. Our aim was to draw some definitive conclusions about the war’s priorities, policies, and progress from the very people who have run America’s national security apparatus over the past half century. Participants include people who have served as secretary of state, national security advisor, retired top commanders from the U.S. military, seasoned members of the intelligence community, and distinguished academics and journalists." The Center for American Progress and the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace are public policy research organizations located in Washington, D.C. Fulltext
A14 - Challenges in Fighting a Global Insurgency
Barno, David W.
Parameters, Summer 2006, v36, #2, pp15-29
What are the implications of asymmetrical warfare on military and defense strategy? From the viewpoint of a military strategist, Barno assesses how the U.S. military can successfully fight insurgencies. “Strategy in a global counterinsurgency requires a new level of thinking. A world of irregular threats and asymmetrical warfare demands that we broaden our thinking beyond the norms of traditional military action once sufficient to win our wars […] We need to contribute more directly toward a comprehensive strategy leading to long-term victory. Battlefield victories result from good tactics, training, and leadership; strategic victories result from thinking through the right strategy and executing it aggressively. Our military should be the repository of the deepest reservoirs of strategic thinking on winning our wars-of any type. But for our military to deny that an asymmetric defeat at the strategic level is even possible in this unconventional war is the equivalent of burying our heads in the sand and increases our risk.” Lieutenant General David W. Barno ( USA Ret.) is the Director of the Near East South Asia Center for Strategic Studies at National Defense University. From 2003 to 2005 he served as commander of over 20,000 US and Coalition forces in Combined Forces Command - Afghanistan. Fulltext
Countries/Regions
A15 - Afghanistan and its Neighbors
Weinbaum, Marvin
United States Institutes of Peace, June 2006, online edition, 20p
"Framing the discussions in this study is the assertion that Afghanistan’s future and that of the regional states are closely bound. Constructive partnerships involving Afghans and their neighbors are essential to regional stability. Just as the capacity of Afghanistan to overcome its political and economic deficits will have deep bearing on the region’s security and development, the domestic stability and foreign policies of the neighboring states will affect the prospects for progress in Afghanistan. Many Afghans insist that outside forces drive the current insurgency in the country, while for the regional players Afghanistan remains a potential source of instability through the export of arms, drugs, and ideology. The study posits that over much of the last four years Afghanistan’s neighbors have assessed that support for a stable, independent, and economically strengthening Afghan state is preferable to any achievable alternatives.” Marvin G. Weinbaum is a scholar-in-residence at the Middle East Institute in Washington, D.C. and professor emeritus of political science at the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign; he was an analyst for Pakistan and Afghanistan in the U.S. Department of State’s Bureau of Intelligence and Research from 1999 to 2003. Fulltext
A16 - Proactive Self-Defense
Boot, Max
The Weekly Standard, Jul 3-Jul 10, 2006, v11, #40, pp17-20
"In Kosovo and Bosnia, NATO troops were strictly limited to ‘peacekeeping’. That is also the role of the NATO troops deployed to Kabul and the northern and western areas, where the Taliban have little support. But it's a different matter in the Pashtun-dominated south. Here, a war is raging, and NATO is getting into the middle of it..." In this article, the author comments on NATO's taking control of the relatively peaceful northern and western provinces of Afghanistan. He concludes also that the best hope for Afghanistan is the growth of the Afghan National Army but they are still incapable of operating without extensive support from the US and other foreign sponsors. Max Boot, a senior fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations, is a contributing editor to the "weekly Standard. Fulltext
A17 - Cop Out: Why Afghanistan Has No Police
Serchuk, Vance
Weekly Standard, 07/17/2006, v11,#41, online edition
"Nearly five years since the ouster of the Taliban and more than three since the fall of Saddam, the Bush administration has repeatedly stumbled in its efforts to create effective foreign police forces. In marked contrast to the army-building efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan, which have begun to yield encouraging results, the indigenous police in both countries appear stuck in a transition to nowhere, slaughtered by insurgents and infiltrated by militias and warlords." This article reviews the reasons why police are harder to recruit and train than an army Police are likewise crucial for democracy and argues that "far more than soldiers or parliamentarians, they are the representatives of state power with whom ordinary citizens have regular contact. Rule of law, civil liberties, human rights--all presuppose the existence of a certain kind of police." Vance Serckuk is a research fellow at AEI. Fulltext
A18 - Rescuing Afghan Reconstruction
Schaffer, Teresita C.
CSIS Commentary, July 6, 2006, 2p
“The most important players in reconstructing Afghanistan are, of course, the Afghans. Of the four elements that postconflict reconstruction experts cite as the pillars of their craft, two – creating decent and effective governance, and putting in place systems for justice and accountability – are overwhelmingly the responsibility of the Afghans. But for the other two – security, and economic and social development – international help can make a major difference. The United States and some 35 other countries have decided that this effort is important enough to warrant a major international commitment of troops and money. It’s time to streamline the policies behind this commitment, making them simple and user-friendly enough to work in the difficult Afghan environment. And it’s time to put up full funding.” Teresita C. Schaffer, Director, Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) South Asia Program. Fulltext
A19 - The Scramble for African Oil
Volman, Daniel
New African, Jul2006, #453, pp16-21
“After decades of Cold War, when Africa was simply viewed as a convenient pawn on the global chessboard, and a further decade of benign neglect in the 1990s, the African continent has now become a vital arena of strategic and geopolitical competition for not only the US, but also for China, India, and other new emerging powers. The main reason for this is quite simple: Africa is the final frontier as far as the world’s supplies of energy (both oil and natural gas) are concerned… Therefore, as in the Middle East and the Caspian Sea region before it, Africa is now a target for military intervention by the US, France, China and other powers competing to gain control over energy supplies.” Daniel Volman, director of the African Security Research Project in Washington. Fulltext
A20 - Sudan: Humanitarian Crisis, Peace Talks, Terrorism & U.S. Policy
Dagne, Ted
Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service, Updated June 1, 2006, online edition, 18p
“ Sudan, geographically the largest country in Africa, has been ravaged by civil war intermittently for four decades. An estimated 2 million people have died over the past two decades due to war-related causes and famine, and millions have been displaced from their homes… Relations between the United States and Sudan are poor in part because of Khartoum’s human rights violations, its war policy in the south, and its support for international terrorism, although in recent months relations have improved somewhat. In November 1997, the Clinton Administration imposed
comprehensive sanctions on the NIF government. President Bush has renewed the sanctions since he came to office in 2001. Ted Dagne, Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division, Congressional Research Service. Fulltext
B21 - Brussels: Next Capital of the Balkans?
O'Brien, James C.
Washington Quarterly, Summer2006, v29 #3, pp71-87
"The article focuses on the initiative of the European Commission (EC) to work with countries of the western Balkans, in preparation for the European Union (EU) membership. Although skepticism about further enlargement of the EU still continue to emerge, the EC continues to judge the aspirants for membership. Leaders in Europe will then decide on whether to live up to their own rhetoric in favor of the expansion or conform to the expectations of their publics by its decision to oppose it." James C. O’Brien is a principal with the Albright Group and was presidential envoy for the Balkans during the Clinton administration. Fulltext
B22 - China's Charm: Implications of Chinese Soft Power
Kurlantzick, Josh
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, June 2006, online edition, 8p
The author argues that, while “China’s rising soft power could prove benign or even beneficial in some respects, it could prove disastrous for Southeast Asia -- for democratization, for anticorruption initiatives, and for good governance. Over the past decade China has downplayed its hard power in Southeast Asia, instead creating a strategy to build its soft power. For the first time in post-WWII history, the United States may be facing a situation in which another country’s appeal outstrips its own in an important region, a change sure to shock the United States. Before China’s appeal spreads to other parts of the developing world, U.S. policy makers need to understand how China exerts soft power, if China’s soft power could be dangerous to developing nations, and whether elements of China’s charm could threaten U.S. interests.” Joshua Kurlantzick is a visiting scholar in the China Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Fulltext
A23 - Containing Iran
Rauch, Jonathan
The Atlantic Monthly, July/ August 2006, v297, #6, pp33-34
“A uranium-enriched Ahmadinejad is a prospect the United States should seek strenuously to avoid, even if the cost is high. But if resignation is the wrong attitude, so is panic. If Iran emerges as a nuclear state, one country in the world will be providentially equipped with decades of applicable experience and a proven strategic template. The country is the United States, the experience is the Cold War, and the template is containment. Here are some things we have seen before: a nuclear-armed country with a brittle and aggressive ideology, world-revolutionary aspirations, and a belief in the historic inevitability of its triumph against a decadent and ultimately hollow West. […]Yes-but the Soviet Union was deferrable. Would the same be true of a nuclear Iran? No one knows, and no one wants to find out, and Ahmadinejad's trash-talking is alarming. Still, that Iran will be "a suicide bomber with a radioactive waist" (as one commentator put it recently) is not a given.” Jonathan Rauch is Correspondent for the Atlantic and Guest Scholar at the Brookings Institution. Fulltext
A24 - Last Stand
Hersh, Seymour
New Yorker, July 10, 2006, v82, #21, pp42-49
“On May 31st, Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice announced what appeared to be a major change in U.S. foreign policy. The Bush Administration, she said, would be willing to join Russia, China, and its European allies in direct talks with Iran about its nuclear program if as the President put it in a June 19th speech at the U.S. Merchant Marine Academy, ‘the Iranian regime fully and verifiably suspends its uranium enrichment and reprocessing activities.’” There was an unspoken threat: the U.S. Strategic Command, supported by the Air Force, has been drawing up plans, at the President's direction, for a major bombing campaign in Iran. Inside the Pentagon, according to Hersh, senior commanders have increasingly challenged the President's plans, telling the Administration that an attack could an attack could lead to serious economic, political, and military consequences for the United States. Seymour Hersh is a New York based investigative journalist who frequently writes for the New Yorker. Fulltext
A25 - The Nuclear Impasse With Iran
Steinbruner, John
America, July 3, 2006, v195, #1, #4738, pp10-13
Regarding the current standstill in negotiations with Iran, should the United States consider new policy approaches in order to prevent the country from obtaining nuclear weapons? Steinbruner argues for a more incentive-driven approach by the United States, especially, since in light of the continuing Iraq war, a military option becomes increasingly less attractive. “In situations where there is an imbalance of capability, the stronger party bears the burden of initiating a process of accommodation. Progress toward a constructive outcome in Iran will have to begin in the United States.” John Steinbruner, Center for International and Security Studies at the University of Maryland. Fulltext
A27 - Zarqawi’s Death Opens Sunni Doors
Munro, Neil
National Journal, June 17, 2006, v39, #24, pp78-79
“The U.S. military's killing of Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, Al Qaeda's leader in Iraq, may rejuvenate a stalled effort by U.S. and Iraqi government officials to strike a deal with Sunni sheiks, whose various tribes provide the manpower for the insurgent and terrorist groups that daily attack American and Iraqi forces. The captured documents vividly demonstrate the effectiveness of Al Qaeda's terrorist campaign, but they also highlight its strategic vulnerability-its determination to impose an extreme Sunni version of sharia law throughout the Muslim world, starting with Iraq's nearly 27 million people.” Neil Munro writes for the National Journal. Fulltext
A28 - Israel's Uncertain Military Performance and Strategic Goals in Lebanon
Cordesman, Anthony H.
CSIS, Center for Strategic & International Studies, July 2006, online edition, 4p
It is difficult to judge Israel's military performance in Lebanon at a distance. Too little data are as yet available, and reporting is necessarily impressionistic. So far, however, it does not seem particularly impressive either in terms of strategy or execution. Israel seems to have escalated without a high probability it could do critical damage to Hezbollah or coerce the Lebanese government, and the tactical execution of its air and land actions seems to be weak. Not unlike the US, Israel has always been much better at using force than at end games. In this case, however, Israel rapidly escalated to the massive use of airpower in ways that only made sense if it felt that it could (a) do meaningful and lasting damage to Hezbollah, and (b) coerce the Lebanese government and military to take advantage of Hezbollah's weakness to fully secure the south and disarm Hezbollah. Anthony Cordesman holds the Arleigh A. Burke Chair in Strategy at CSIS. Fulltext
A29 - Israel and Nuclear Proliferation in the Middle East
Bahgat, Gawdat
Middle East Policy, Summer 2006 v13, #3 pp113-133
“An accurate assessment of Israel's nuclear program is almost impossible, given that the Israeli government has never acknowledged making nuclear weapons and has never published any account of its nuclear activities. Non-Israeli sources--which most scholarly work relies on-- give various estimates of the actual size and composition of Israel's nuclear stockpile, but the overall consensus is that Israel possesses an extensive arsenal
of nuclear devices and an array of medium-range missiles that could deliver them. Here, Bahgat examines Israel's nuclear program.” Gawdat Bahgat is Director of the Center for Middle Eastern Studies in the Department of Political Science at Indiana University in Pennsylvania. Fulltext
A30 - Is It Good For the Jews?
Levy, Daniel
The American Prospect, July/August 2006, v17, #7, pp33-37
“Clearly, there is no one view as to what constitutes the Israeli interest, but the outlines of an emerging consensus are at least partially visible. Occupation is bad for Israel... Settlements have placed a strain on Israel's budget, defensive lines, and international reputation. They also breed an internal antidemocratic threat to the state. Peace and the territorial concessions entailed, including evacuating most of the settlements, is the best and perhaps only guarantee of Israel's future. U.S. policy, under the influence of an unreconstructed Israel lobby of neoconservatives, fundamentalist evangelicals, and American Likudniks, is liable to follow directions that are unhelpful to this Israeli interest. Three unwelcome types of policy suggest themselves. Let's call them: initiative recoil, the obstacle
course, and an addiction to misbehavior without consequence.” This article assesses how the Israel lobby in Washington influences U.S. foreign policy toward Israel. Daniel Levy was an adviser in the Israeli prime minister's office, a member of the official Israeli negotiating team at the Oslo B and Taba talks, and the lead Israeli drafter of the Geneva Initiative. Fulltext
A31 - Grand Strategy: Why America Should Promote a New Liberal Order in the Middle East
Pollack, Kenneth M.
Blueprint Magazine, July 22, 2006
“There are many problems with the Bush administration's Middle East policies. The greatest, however, has been its failure to conceive and pursue a grand strategy toward the region. As a result, many of America's policies are mutually contradictory: They hinder one another and make it harder to achieve our principal goals in the region. Just as America tailored its policies toward every other country during the Cold War to support the strategy of containment, it must now fashion a similar strategy toward the Middle East if it is to meet the challenges that are rooted there.” Kenneth M. Pollack, Director of Research, Saban Center for Middle East Policy. Fulltext
A32- Lebanon
Prados, Alfred B.
CRS Report, July 24, 2006, online edition, 24p
"...The United States and Lebanon have traditionally enjoyed good relations, rooted in long-standing contacts and interaction beginning well before Lebanon’s emergence as a modern state. Factors contributing to this relationship include a large Lebanese-
American community (a majority of Arab-Americans are of Lebanese origin); the pro-Western orientation of many Lebanese, particularly during the Cold War; cultural ties exemplified by the presence of U.S. universities in Lebanon; Lebanon’s position as a partial buffer between Israel and its principal Arab adversary, namely Syria; Lebanon’s democratic and partially Christian antecedents; and Lebanon’s historic role as an interlocutor for the United States within the Arab world.
Two U.S. presidents have described Lebanon as of vital interest to the United States, President Eisenhower in 1958 and President Reagan in 1983. Both statements were made in the context of brief U.S. military
deployments to Lebanon to help Lebanese authorities counter rebellions supported by radical Arab states with ties to the former Soviet Union. Some would agree that a friendly and independent Lebanon in a strategic but unstable region is vital to U.S. interests. But others might disagree, pointing to the absence of such tangible interests as military bases, oil fields, international waterways, military or industrial strength, or major trading ties. In a broader sense, a ruinous 15-year civil war that created turmoil in Lebanon between 1975 and 1990 and that periodically threatened to spill over into adjacent areas of the Middle East illustrated the dangers to U.S. interests posed by instability in this small country." Fulltext
A33 - Living with Palestinian Democracy
Brown, Nathan J.
Policy Brief #46, June 2006, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
“By electing a parliament dominated by Hamas, Palestinians have sharply challenged U.S. policy. The initial American reaction— undermining the new government—will leave the population in chaos, with various Palestinian groups vying for influence. Political constraints preclude anything but a Hamas government in the short term. But the Hamas victory should not be viewed as a defeat for the American vision of reform—which, indeed, may offer a path out of the current deadlock. The United States should develop a policy for the longer term to continue calming the Israeli-Palestinian conflict; maintain the Palestinian Authority; and work for political reform by focusing on the judiciary, media, and other institutions that are independent of the current regime. […]If the United States reacts to the first electoral defeat of a governing Arab party by working to overturn the results, the message will reverberate around the region almost as loudly as what is happening in Iraq.” Nathan J. Brown is Senior Associate with the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Fulltext
A34 -
The East Moves West
Kemp, Geoffrey
The National Interest, Summer 2006, #84, pp71-77
“In the coming years, India and China again will become increasingly important players in the Middle East. The United States will have to accept that its ‘unipolar moment’ in the Middle East is transitory. Today the United States has satisfactory relations with China, and there is much discussion of a new U.S.-Indian strategic relationship. Does this mean, however, that India will eventually cooperate on Gulf security? Or that China will be a continuing partner in the effort to bring stability to the world's most important source for oil and natural gas? Both countries have their own agenda for the region that may, over time, diverge from U.S. objectives.” Geoffrey Kemp is Director of Regional Strategic Programs at the Nixon Center. He served as Special Assistant to President Reagan and was Senior Director for Near East and South Asian Affairs on the National Security Council staff. Fulltext
A35 - A Brief Analysis of the Republic of Korea's Defense Reform Plan
Bennett, Bruce
Rand, July 2006, 55p
"In September 2005, the Republic of Korea announced a Defense Reform Plan designed to modernize military equipment and achieve a higher level of professional military personnel. Core aspects of the plan are examined, with major risks identified and ways to manage those risks discussed." Bruce Bennett is a senior policy analyst at RAND, a nonprofit organization that helps to improve policy and decision-making through research and analysis. Fulltext
A36 - Russia Leaves the West
Trenin, Dmitri
Foreign Affairs, July/August 2005, v85,#4, pp.87-96
“U.S.-Russian relations [are] at their lowest point -- and the Kremlin at its most confident -- since 1991, Washington must recognize that frustrated Russia-bashing is futile. It must understand that positive change in Russia can only come from within and that economic realities, rather than democratic ideals, will be the vehicle for that change. And most important, as president and CEO of the international system, the United States must do everything it can to ensure that the system does not once again succumb to dangerous and destabilizing great-power rivalry.” This article examines the post-Cold War strategy that offered Russia “privileged treatment but no real prospect of membership in either NATO or the EU.” The hope was that Russia would gradually transform itself, with Western assistance, into a democratic polity and a market economy. “ Russia, however, was only willing to consider joining the West if it was given something like co-chairmanship of the Western club -- or at the very least membership in its Politburo. Despite, therefore, all of the talk about Russia's integration into Western institutions, the project was stillborn from the beginning.” Dmitri Trenin is deputy director of the Carnegie Moscow Center. Fulltext
|
